A BRICS handshake and what it concealed
When Xi and Modi exchanged a brief, courteous greeting in Johannesburg, the moment drew worldwide attention. Yet that photo-op papered over persistent strategic frictions that run far deeper than summit-stage pleasantries. After months of subdued diplomacy and tense military posturing along the contested Himalayan border, Beijing and New Delhi remain divided by unresolved territorial claims, mutual distrust and competing visions for regional influence. Any meaningful thaw will therefore be incremental and contingent, not instantaneous.
Border realities: calm in public, preparedness in practice
More than a symbolic pause
The visual calm around high-level meetings obscures an operational environment defined by vigilance. Patrols along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) still shadow each other closely. Both governments have accelerated construction of high-altitude roads, tunnels and forward airstrips-projects that look civilian but steeply increase logistical reach for forces in the mountains. The 2020 Galwan Valley clashes demonstrated how localized confrontations can have outsized political consequences; since then, encounters have been managed through tactical disengagements and talks rather than resolved by any lasting border settlement.
Engineering that doubles as deterrence
Infrastructure upgrades serve dual purposes: they ease movement for civilians while substantially shortening military response times and complicating crisis management in rugged terrain. For New Delhi and Beijing, such projects are a form of strategic insurance-shoring up defensive capabilities and creating bargaining chips in any future negotiations.
Beyond the range of artillery: contesting influence across the region
Strategic competition extends into the Indian Ocean and the broader Indo-Pacific. New Delhi has been deepening partnerships with Quad members-the United States, Japan and Australia-to strengthen defense interoperability and build more resilient supply chains. China’s Belt and Road Initiative and port-linked investments continue to expand its footprint from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal and the wider maritime commons. Ports, trade corridors and connectivity programs have become new theatres of influence rivalry, with countries such as Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), and island states in the Indian Ocean serving as focal points of investment and strategic jockeying.
Commerce tempered by caution
Economic ties between the two giants remain substantial-trade flows are well into the tens of billions of dollars annually even amid political friction-but commercial interaction now happens with heightened scrutiny. India has tightened its foreign investment screening and restricted certain digital services (for example, the 2019 app bans against some Chinese mobile applications), while China continues to push state-backed megaprojects to secure long-term economic access. The result is pragmatic trade co-dependence layered atop strategic hedging.
How smaller states navigate the rivalry: pragmatic balancing
Many governments across Asia and the Indian Ocean avoid binary choices, preferring to extract benefits from both powers while safeguarding autonomy. Southeast Asian capitals, island states and South Asian neighbours often accept Chinese infrastructure finance while simultaneously cultivating defense and technology links with the United States, India, Japan and others. This hedging includes diversifying suppliers, imposing data and security safeguards for foreign tech, and keeping diplomatic channels open with multiple partners to avoid overdependence.
Reducing the odds of a dangerous misstep
Why goodwill gestures need institutional follow-up
A cordial image between leaders lowers rhetoric and can create breathing space for diplomacy, but it does not eliminate the risk of accidents. To prevent inadvertent escalation, durable, institutionalized mechanisms are essential-beyond episodic summits-so that incidents at sea, in the air or on land can be managed rapidly and predictably.
Practical, actionable measures
Policymakers on both sides (and their partners) are increasingly considering concrete tools that could lower tension and build habitual cooperation:
– Redundant hotlines linking heads of state, defense chiefs and regional commanders across secure networks to ensure messages get through even during technical outages.
– Standardized, rapid incident-notification formats so encounters are logged consistently and misunderstandings are minimized.
– Regular joint drills and table-top simulations focused on de-escalation protocols, search-and-rescue, and disaster response to build working relationships.
– Neutral verification mechanisms or communication hubs hosted by impartial third parties to vouch for facts and reduce disputes about intent.
– Publicly accessible dashboards or registries that record near-miss events in limited, declassified form to encourage transparency and deter risky behavior.
– Cyber and space incident-response coordination as a recognition that modern crises can begin in non-kinetic domains.
Pilots centered on humanitarian missions and maritime safety can create operational trust before countries attempt cooperation on more sensitive military issues.
Multilateral platforms, incentives and domestic trends
Using institutions to keep lines open
Expanded forums-such as a growing BRICS group and other regional formats-provide diplomatic cover for engagement even as bilateral competition persists. Both capitals use multilateral stages to manage domestic audiences and international expectations without committing to binding bilateral concessions. At the same time, groupings like ASEAN and the Quad serve as venues for setting regional norms on maritime conduct, cyber security and critical infrastructure protection.
Demographics and tech competition as structural drivers
Longer-term structural shifts also shape the rivalry. According to United Nations estimates, India became the world’s most populous country in 2023, a demographic milestone that will influence labor markets, domestic policy priorities and strategic planning for decades. Meanwhile, competition over advanced technologies-semiconductors, telecommunications, artificial intelligence and cryptography-blurs the line between economic policy and national security, with export controls and investment screening becoming regular tools of statecraft.
Can summit civility evolve into reliable détente?
The Johannesburg exchange between Xi and Modi mattered: it lowered tensions in public and signaled a willingness to keep channels open. But without transparent, verifiable roadmaps and routine, operational confidence-building measures, such moments are fragile. Persistent drivers-territorial disputes, overlapping regional strategies and mutual suspicion over technology and influence-will continually shape interactions across the Indo-Pacific.
Conclusion: managing rivalry through systems, not ceremonies
The handshake was a useful diplomatic reset, not a resolution. Real progress will come from institutionalizing safeguards that reduce the risk of miscalculation while permitting careful economic engagement. The central question for policymakers is less whether the two leaders can cultivate personal rapport and more whether their governments can design trustworthy, routine mechanisms-hotlines, shared procedures, joint drills and third-party verification-that prevent a small incident from escalating into a strategic crisis. In the end, Asia’s balance of power will be determined as much by these everyday practices as by headline summits.